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7KHUHDOLVPWKDWGLGQRWVSHDNLWVQDPH(+&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHV
RIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLV 
Abstract 
E.H. &DUUZDVRQHRI(XURSH¶VSUHHPLQHQWWKLQNHUVLQWKHILHOGRILQWHUQDWLRQDODIIDLUV<HWKLV
contribution to International Relations theory is continually questioned. Realists depict Carr as 
a quintessential realist; revisionists draw from his wider corpus to qualify his contribution. 
Although not inaccurate, the revisionist literature is incomplete as it neglects a number of 
&DUU¶V diplomatic histories. Refocusing on these, especially the manner in which traces of 
5DQNH¶V the primacy of foreign affairs tradition are evident, this paper points to a more 
conservative and less critical Carr. Utilising an interpretivist framework, this shift in traditions 
of thought is explained by the dilemmas Carr faced. Although works of history rather than 
WKHRU\WKHSDSHUFRQWHQGVWKDW&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVUHPDLQUHOHYDQWSDUWLFXODUO\ZLWK
regard to the embedded criticism of realpolitik they contain. This realisation is made evident 
through a reading of Carr in parallel with the concept of tragedy.   
Introduction 
History begins when men begin to think of the passages of time in terms not of natural 
SURFHVVHV«EXWDVHULHVRIVSHFLILFHYHQWVLQZKLFKPHQ are consciously involved and which they 
FDQ FRQVFLRXVO\ LQIOXHQFH«0DQ QRZ VHHNV WR XQGHUVWDQG DQG WR DFW RQ QRW RQO\ KLV
environment but himself.1 
The above passage from What is History can be applied to modern International Relations (IR) 
theory. SylveVWQRWHVWKDWWKHµKLVWRU\RILQWHUQDWLRQDOWKRXJKWEURDGO\XQGHUVWRRGLVQRZD
fast-JURZLQJ ILHOG¶2 ,5¶VKLVWRULRJUDSKLFDO WXUQKDV UHVXOWHG LQDFRQVFLRXVHIIRUW WR UHYLVLW
revise and deepen our understanding of IR theory and the history of international thought. This 
KDVUHVXOWHGLQDTXHVWLRQLQJRIWKHGLVFLSOLQH¶VIRXQGDWLRQDOP\WKVFRQFHSWVDQGFDWHJRULHV3 
It has also led to a veritable cottage industry challenging tired understandings of canonical, 
typically realist figures.4 Potentially traced WR $VKOH\¶V DWWHPSW WR FUHDWH D ZHGJH EHWZHHQ
classical and modern forms of realism,5 the movement has sought to chart intellectual and 
epistemological linkages between classical theorists and contemporary critical theorists. This 
has involved a greater appreciation of the critique of modernity contained within the classical 
works; a greater recognition of the influence of Mannheim and the Frankfurt school on the 
                                                 
1 E.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 134.  
2 Casper Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880±1930: Making Progress? (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2009), p. 5.  
3 6HH IRU LQVWDQFH %ULDQ 6FKPLGW µ7KH KLVWRULRJUDSK\ RI DFDGHPLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV¶ Review of 
International Studies, 20:4 (1994), pp. 349±3HWHU:LOVRQµ7KHP\WKRIWKHILUVWJUHDWGHEDWH¶Review of 
International Studies, 24:5 (1998), pp. 1± /XFLDQ 0 $VKZRUWK µ:KHUH DUH WKH LGHDOLVWV LQ LQWHUZDU
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV"¶ Review of International Studies, 32:2 (2006), pp. 291±308; Brian Schmidt (ed.), 
International Relations and the Great First Debate (London: Routledge, 2012).  
4 This literature is impressively large and growing. Indicative texts include, Richard N. Lebow, The Tragic Vision 
of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the 
Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Seán Molloy, The Hidden 
History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Michael C. Williams 
(ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Duncan Bell (ed.), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
5 5LFKDUG.$VKOH\µ7KHSRYHUW\RIQHRUHDOLVP¶International Organization, 38:2 (1984), pp. 225±286. 
classical works, especially with regard to the conditionality of knowledge; and a desire to point 
to the misreading of the classical realist works by modern realists.6 Although undoubtedly the 
vast majority of work in this vein has focused on the iconic Hans J. Morgenthau, a significant 
number of scholars have turned their intellectual spades onto WKHIHUWLOHJURXQGOHIWE\%ULWDLQ¶V
HTXDOO\LFRQLFILJXUH(+&DUU&DUU¶VSUHYLRXVO\RQH-dimensional characterisation, in turn, 
has increasingly been destabilised.7  
As will be shown in the first section, recent advances in scholarship in Carr have sought to 
deepen our understanding of his work and his place in the IR discipline by: i.) undertaking a 
closer and more thorough reading of his most (in)famous work, The TweQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV; and 
ii.) developing a broader appreciation of his work as a whole by situating 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶
Crisis alongside his other pre- and post-war scholarship. The point of this essay is not to 
challenge this development outright; nor do I wish to suggest that the broadening and 
deepening of our understanding of Carr is inaccurate. Instead, I use the space below to suggest 
that the revisionist turn with regards to E.H. Carr is incomplete because it has hitherto 
overlooked a number of diplomatic histories RIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVthat he produced in the 
course of his long and productive career. Turning to these, and particularly focusing on the 
manner that they reflect the Primat der Außenpolitik tradition, I suggest that in his diplomatic 
histories we find a more conservative and traditional realism and a less critical realism.  
Utilising an interpretivist framework that allows for an exploration of the dilemmas that 
LQIOXHQFH D WKLQNHU¶V WUDGLWLRQV RI WKRXJKW WKLV DUWLFOH DFFRUGLQJO\ VHHNV WR H[SORUH &DUU¶V
evolution from a radical international political theorist into a conservative historian. Focusing 
on three works on Soviet affairs that he produced at the twilight of his career, the paper explores 
the influence WKDW5DQNH¶VWKHSULPDF\Rf foreign affairs tradition had on Carr, if indirectly and 
implicitly. Although traditional histories, which separates Carr from the North American realist 
tradition, and certainly lacking in critical theorising vis-à-vis his inter-war work, it is argued 
that these works still have contemporary relevance for Carr-specific scholars and IR theory 
PRUH EURDGO\ ,Q FORVLQJ WKH SDSHU UHIOHFWV RQ KRZ &DUU¶V ILQDO WKRXJKWV UHJDUGLQJ WKH
dénouement RIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVmay help us appreciate and understand this tragic figure.  
 
I. Carr¶VUHDOLVP with adjectives  
Carr revisionism KDVFKDOOHQJHGUHDOLVWRUWKRGR[\,WLVDUJXHGWKDWUHDOLVWVRYHUVLPSOLI\&DUU¶V
work in two respects. First, realists undertake a one-dimensional reading of his most (in)famous 
                                                 
6 6HHIRULQVWDQFH:LOOLDP%DLQµ'HFRQIXVLQJ0RUJHQWKDX0RUDOLQTXLU\DQGFODVVLFDOUHDOLVPUHFRQVLGHUHG¶
Review of International Studies, 26:3 (2000), pp. 445±0XULHOOH&R]HWWHµ5HFODLPLQJWKHFULWLFDOGLPHQVLRQ
RIUHDOLVP+DQV-0RUJHQWKDXRQWKHHWKLFVRIVFKRODUVKLS¶Review of International Studies, 34:1 (2008), pp. 5±
27; WilOLDP(6FKHXHUPDQµ5HDOLVPDQGWKH/HIW7KHFDVHRI+DQV-0RUJHQWKDX¶Review of International 
Studies, 34:1 (2008), pp. 29±+DUWPXW%HKUDQG$PHOLD+HDWKµ0LVUHDGLQJLQ,5WKHRU\DQGLGHRORJ\FULWLTXH
Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-UHDOLVP¶Review of International Studies, 35:2 (2009), pp. 327±349; Felix Rösch, 
µPuovoir, puissance DQG SROLWLFV +DQV 0RUJHQWKDX¶V GXDOLVWLF FRQFHSW RI SRZHU¶ Review of International 
Studies, 40:2 (2014), pp. 349±365. 
7 This one-dimensional depiction is still evident in certain quarters. Elman and Jensen, as an example, write that 
the classical realist research programme, which can be traced to the publication of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, hones 
LQRQ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH µGHVLUHIRUPRUHSRZHU LV URRWHG LQ WKH IODZHGQDWXUHRIKXPDQLW\¶7KDW LV µVWDWHVDUH
FRQWLQXRXVO\HQJDJHGLQDVWUXJJOHWRLQFUHDVHWKHLUFDSDELOLWLHV¶WKDWIRUFODVVLFDOUHDOLVWVµLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV
FDQEHFKDUDFWHUL]HGDVHYLO¶DQGWKDWµFODVVLFDOUHDOLVPH[SODLQVFRQIOLFWXDOEHKDYLRUE\KXPDQIDLOLQJV¶&ROLQ
Elman and Michael Jenson (eds.), The Realism Reader (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 3.  
work, 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV ZKLFK LJQRUHV WKH WH[W¶V VXEWOHWLHV DQG QXDQFHV8 Second, 
realists typically read 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV in isolation, failing to appreciate it in terms of 
the wider pre- and post-war literature that Carr produced.9 In challenging convention, 
UHYLVLRQLVWVKDYHPRUHFOHDUO\GHOLQHDWHG&DUU¶VUHDOLVPZLWKDQXPEHURITXDOLI\LQJDGMHFWLYHV 
Utopian realism can be traced to Booth.10 &DOOLQJ &DUU D µSRWHQWLDO XWRSLDQ UHDOLVW¶ %RRWK
pointed to the positive and normative ideas Carr voiced regarding a more progressive post-war 
order.11 5HIHUULQJPRUHZLGHO\WR&DUU¶VFRUSXVRIZRUN+RZHOLNHZLVHFRQWHQGHGWKDWZKLOH
&DUUDFFHSWHGDVSHFWVRIUHDOLVPKHZDVQHYHUWKHOHVVµFRQILGHQWWKDWWLPHDORQJZLWKKHDOWK\
measures of utopianism, woulGEULQJDERXWDPRUHSHDFHIXODQG MXVW LQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHU¶12 
More recent work by Kenealy and Konstantinos, whilst never using the label, also touches upon 
WKHVHLGHDV&KDUWLQJWKHSULQFLSDOLGHDVDQLPDWLQJ&DUU¶VSUH- and post-war work, they stress 
&DUU¶VFRQFHUQZLWKEXLOGLQJDQHZRUGHUIROORZLQJWKH6HFRQG:RUOd War.13 Applying this 
VSHFLILFDOO\WR&DUU¶VZULWLQJRQWKHVWDWH&DUU¶VGLVWLQFWLYHUHDOLVPUHVWHGLQWKHSULQFLSOHWKDW
power had to be directed toward a progressive goal.14 Utopian realism reminds us of the way 
LQ ZKLFK &DUU¶V ZRUN ZDV IXWXUH-orientated, concerned ultimately with a more progressive 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHU&ULWLFDOUHDOLVPLQFRQWUDVWFRQQHFWV&DUU¶VZRUNWRFRQWHPSRUDU\FULWLFDO
WKHRU\/LQNODWHUDVDQH[DPSOHVRXJKWWRµUHOHDVH&DUUIURPWKHJULSRIWKH5HDOLVWVDQGWR
highlight certain affinities between his writings on the state and critical theories of international 
UHODWLRQV¶15 LinklateU¶VFHQWUDOSRLQWZDVWKDW&DUU¶VZRUNwas emancipatory given that he was 
concerned with transnational forms of community and citizenship.16 Likewise, Babík 
HPSKDVLVHVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKH)UDQNIXUWVFKRRORQ&DUU¶VPDMRUWH[WVFRQFOXGLQJWKDWµWKH
WHUP³UHDOLVP´VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ FRQQRWHG IRU&DUUPDQ\HOHPHQWVQRZDGD\VDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
FULWLFDO WKHRU\¶17 2WKHUV VWUHVV &DUU¶V KLVWRULFDO PHWKRG DQG RXWORRN, however. This can 
LQLWLDOO\EHWUDFHGWR&R[¶VHPSKDVLVRQ&DUU¶VKLVWRULFDOPDWHULDOLVP18 It is Germain, however, 
who has made the most extensive case for the qualified historical realist label.19 Focusing on 
7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV, Nationalism and After, The New Society and What is History, 
*HUPDLQ SRLQWV WR &DUU¶V VWUHVV RQ KLVWRULFDO FKDQJH DQG KLV EDODQFH RI GHWHUPLQLVP DQG
                                                 
8 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919±1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (reissued 
edition edited by Michael Cox, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. xiii.  
9 3HWHU:LOVRQµRadicalism for a conservative purpose: The peculiar realism of E.H. Carr¶ Millennium±Journal 
of International Studies, 30:2 (2001), pp. 123±136, at p. 125. 
10 .HQ%RRWKµSecurity in anarchy: Utopian UHDOLVPLQWKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH¶ International Affairs, 67:3 (1991), 
pp. 527±545. 
11 Ibid., pp. 530±531. 
12 3DXO+RZHµ7KHXWRSLDQUHDOLVPRI(+&DUU¶ Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 277±297, at 
p. 277.  
13 Daniel Kenealy and Konstantinos KostagiannisµRealist visions of European 8QLRQ(+&DUUDQGLQWHJUDWLRQ¶ 
Millennium±Journal of International Studies, 41:2 (2012), pp. 221±246. 
14 Ibid., pp. 241±242. 
15 $QGUHZ /LQNODWHU µThe transformation of political community: E.H. Carr, critical theory and International 
5HODWLRQV¶Review of International Studies, 23:3 (1997), pp. 321±338, at p. 324.  
16 Ibid., pp. 330±338.  
17 0LODQ%DEtNµRealism as critical theory: The iQWHUQDWLRQDOWKRXJKWRI(+&DUU¶ International Studies Review, 
15:4 (2013), pp. 491±DWS6HHDOVR7LP'XQQHµ7KHRULHVDVZHDSRQV(+&DUUDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO
5HODWLRQV¶in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 217±
233. 
18 5REHUW &R[ µSocial forces, states and world orders: Beyond ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV WKHRU\¶ Millennium±
Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126±155, at p. 131.  
19 5DQGDOO*HUPDLQµE.H. Carr and WKHKLVWRULFDOPRGHRIWKRXJKW¶LQ0LFKDHO Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical 
Appraisal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 322±338. 
YROXQWDULVPWRDUJXHWKDW&DUU¶VµDSSURDFKLV³UHDOLVW´LQWHUPVRILWVSUDFWLFDODFFHSWDQFHRI
the structural parameters of evHU\OLIHDQGKLVWRULFDOLQWHUPVRIKLVPHWKRG¶20 
2QHPD\WKLQNWKDWWKHJURZWKRILQWHUHVWLQ&DUU¶VZRUNKDVH[KDXVWHGDOOWKDWFRXOGEHNQRZQ
about his work. Such a view would be erroneous. Whilst no doubt accurate, the revisionist 
literature is currently incomplete. This is because it overlooks the work that Carr produced on 
Soviet foreign affairs in the twilight of his career. Although historical, and generally seen as 
relatively minor, they may have much to tell us DERXW&DUU¶VSROLWLFDOWKRXJKWVSHFLfically and 
his thought toward IR more broadly. If it is true that we can only gain a deeper understanding 
RI&DUU¶VWKRXJKWDVDZKROHby engaging with his oeuvre in its entirety, then the neglect of his 
historical work is an oversight in need of correction. 
II. Traditions and dilemmas 
To more FOHDUO\VSHFLI\WKHSUREOHPFDQZHUHODWH&DUU¶VSUH- and post-war IR work, which 
has been depicted in more critical theoretical terms in the revisionist literature, with his more 
traditional histories of Soviet foreign affairs, which have often been marginalised in the 
revisionist literature (and indeed amongst realists)? More broadly, this is a question of how and 
ZK\DVFKRODU¶VWKRXJKWHYROYHVRYHUWLPH7RDGGUHVVWKLVTXHVWLRQLWVHHPVORJLFDOWRWXUQWR
Bevirian interpretivism, outlined initially in The Logic of the History of Ideas and subsequently 
utilised to interpret inter alia international political thought.21  
In Logic Bevir outlined and defended an anti-foundationalist hermeneutic which called for 
intelOHFWXDOKLVWRULDQVWRWUDQVODWHWKHµSHRSOHRIWKHSDVWWRXVWRGD\¶22 Studying the ideas of 
the past for Bevir meant recovering and reconstructing the meaning of said ideas.23 Meaning is 
WKXVFUXFLDOIRULQWHUSUHWLYLVWVEHFDXVHWKH\DUJXHWKDWµSHRSOHEHKDve as they do because of 
WKHLUEHOLHIVDQGWKHRULHVDERXWKRZWKHZRUOGZRUNV¶24 $QLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIVDQGWKHRULHVRI
the world are not sui generis, however. This is because individuals cannot be isolated from 
society in any meaningful respect. Carr was aware of this notion. He made clear in What is 
Historyµ>that DQLQGLYLGXDO¶V@HDUOLHVWLGHDVFRPH«IURPRWKHUV¶25 To understand this logic, 
Bevirian interpretivists refer to traditions. Traditions are conceived of as a set of beliefs and 
understandings that are received by an individual through socialisation processes.26 Traditions 
can be transmitted in a variety of ways, e.g. through peers, parents and forms of political 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 332.  
21 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ian Hall and 
0DUN%HYLUµ7UDGLWLRQVRI%ULWLVKinternational thouJKW¶The International History Review, 36:5 (2014), pp. 823±
/HRQLH+ROWKDXVµ/7+REKRXVHDQGWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIOLEHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP¶Review of International 
Studies, 40:4 (2014), pp. 705± /HRQLH +ROWKDXV DQG -HQV 6WHIIHN µ([SHULPHQWV in international 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ7KHIRUJRWWHQIXQFWLRQDOLVPRI-DPHV$UWKXU6DOWHU¶Review of International Studies, 42:1 (2016), 
pp. 114±135. See, also, Mark Bevir and Roderick A.W. Rhodes, Interpreting British Governance (London: 
Routledge, 2003); MarN%HYLU2OLYHU'DGGRZDQG,DQ+DOOµ,QWUoduction: Interpreting British foreign pROLF\¶
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15:2 (2013), pp. 164±174; Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow 
and Ian Hall (eds.), Interpreting Global Security (London: Routledge, 2014); Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and 
3DXOLQH6FKQDSSHUµ,QWUoduction: Interpreting British European pROLF\¶Journal of Common Market Studies, 53:1 
(2015), pp. 1± 0DUN %HYLU DQG 2OLYHU 'DGGRZ µ,QWHUSUHting Foreign Policy: National, comparative and 
regional sWXGLHV¶International Relations, 29:3 (2015), pp. 273±287. 
22 Bevir, Logic, p. 158. 
23 Ibid., p. 31. 
24 ,DQ+DOOµ7KH3URPLVHDQG3HULORI,QWHUSUHWLYLVPLQ$XVWUDOLDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV¶Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, 73:3 (2014), pp. 307±316, at p. 308. 
25 Carr, What is History, p. 31. 
26 Bevir, Logic, p. 200. 
discourse, including texts.27 The idealised teacher-pupil relationship, although not necessarily 
formalised, is often used as a metaphor to explain traditions.28 The pupil receives knowledge 
from their teacher and, in turn, transmits this knowledge to subsequent generations. The 
idealised teacher-pupil relationship, however, fails to capture how traditions mutate over time. 
$V%HYLUH[SODLQVµ$VEHOLHIVSDVVIURPWHDFKHUWRSXSLOVRWKHSXSLOPRGLILHVDQGH[WHQGVWKH
WKHPHV RU FRQFHSWXDO FRQQHFWLRQV WKDW OLQNHG >WKHLU@ EHOLHIV¶29 Accordingly, Bevirian 
interpretivists refer to situDWHGDJHQF\ZKLOVWWUDGLWLRQVPD\LQLWLDOO\FRQGLWLRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V 
beliefs, because individuals have agency to interpret and reinterpret, traditions ultimately do 
not determine individual beliefs.30 To flesh out this logic Bevirian interpretivists refer to 
GLOHPPDV 'LOHPPDV DUH FRQFHLYHG RI DV µDXWKRULWDWLYH XQGHUVWDQGLQJV WKDW SXW LQWR
TXHVWLRQ«H[LVWLQJ ZHEV RI EHOLHI¶31 In accepting new information as true, if said new 
information conflicts with an LQGLYLGXDO¶VH[LVWLQJZHERIEHOLHIDQLQGLYLGXDOLV compelled to 
reconsider their understandings of the world ,Q WXUQDQ LQGLYLGXDOFDQµUHWUHQFK UHYLVHRU
HYHQUHMHFWVRPHRUDOORI>WKHLU@LQKHULWHGNQRZOHGJH¶32 Importantly, individuals engage in 
this process innovatively and FUHDWLYHO\&DUU¶VDQG*LOEHUW0XUUD\¶VGLIIHUHQWUHVSRQVHVWRWKH
Abyssinian crisis evidence this (Carr turned from liberal internationalism toward a realism 
infused with Marxism while Murray retrenched his liberal internationalist worldview).33 In the 
subsequent sections of this paper traditions and dilemmas are employed to help us chart and 
understand &DUU¶VHYROXWLRQIURPFULWLFWRWUDGLWLRQDOLVWKLVWRULDQ7RGRVRit is first necessary 
to outline important traditions of thought that he inherited and the salient dilemmas he faced in 
the course of his career.  
III.  Traditions and dilemmas in the thought of E.H. Carr  
Trying to unpack the traditions that influenced E.H. Carr is problematic, chiefly because he 
was exceedingly eclectic in his approach to political thought. Molloy HYHQFDOOVKLPµPDJSLH-
OLNH¶ LQ WKLV UHJDUG34 His major pre-war work, 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV, was primarily a 
polemic undertaken to influence British political discourse with regard to Germany.35 
$FFRUGLQJWR&DUUZKLOVWµLWZDVQRWH[DFWO\D0DU[LVWZRUN>LW@ZDVVWURQJO\LPSUHJQDWHG
ZLWK 0DU[LVW ZD\V RI WKLQNLQJ DSSOLHG WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO DIIDLUV¶36 Conditions of Peace, in 
FRQWUDVW ZDV ZKDW &DUU WHUPHG KLV µVRUW RI OLEHUDO 8WRSLD¶37 Although comparatively less 
analysis of Conditions has been undertaken, it would be reasonable to hypothesise that George 
/OR\G¶VDQG(GZDUG:RRG¶V ODWHU/RUG+DOLID[ The Great Opportunity LQIOXHQFHG&DUU¶V
more idealist prose.38 Nevertheless, those with a close working relationship with Carr recognise 
that he was very much influenced by the realist tradition.39 Carr struggled with realism, 
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29 Bevir, Logic, p. 204 
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31 Bevir, Logic, pp. 221±222. 
32 Hall and Bevir, p. 829.  
33 Ibid., p. 829.  
34 Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism, p. 53. 
35 Charles Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 46. 
36 (+&DUU µ$Q $XWRELRJUDSK\¶ in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), pp. xii±xxii, at p. xix. 
37 &DUUµ$XWRELRJUDSK\¶S[L[ 
38 George Lloyd and Edward Wood, The Great Opportunity (London: John Murray, 1919). Carr admitted in his 
biographical statement (see previous footnote) that he was ashamed of the harshness of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV. 
This dilemma potentially explains his evolving thought between these publications.  
39 -RQDWKDQ +DVODP DUJXHG WKDW &DUU ZDV µXOWLPDWHO\ LQGLIIHUHQW¶ WR KLV LPDJH DV D µKDUG-boiled advocate of 
Machtpolitik 3RZHU 3ROLWLFV¶ EHFDXVH µKH UHFRJQLVHG WKH LPDJH WR EH QRW DOWRJHWKHU LQDFFXUDWH¶ -RQDWKDQ
however. His 28th 'HFHPEHUGLDU\HQWU\UHFRUGVWKDWKHZDVµ6WLOORQUHDOLVP6WLOOYHU\
RGG¶40 ,QWXUQ&DUU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWion of the realist tradition was innovative and creative. This is 
particularly true with regard 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV. It actually contained two realisms: a 
conservative, practical and pragmatic realism versus a radical, theoretical and critical realism.41 
:KHUHDV WKH IRUPHU ZKLFK ZDV HYLGHQW PRVW FOHDUO\ LQ WKH WH[W¶V VHFRQG FKDSWHU ZDV
influenced by the conservative realist tradition, the latter which was most prominent in the 
WH[W¶V ILIWK FKDSWHU ZDV LQIOXHQFHG PRUH UHDGLO\ E\ 0DU[LVP EURDGO\ DQG 0DQQKHLP¶V
Standortgebundenheit des Denkens more specifically.42  
The conservative realist tradition includes ideas known commonly as the Primat der 
Außenpolitik (the primacy of foreign affairs), which can be traced to Leopold von Ranke in 
terms of philosophy and Otto von Bismarck in terms of practice.43 Although Ranke did not 
explicitly use the term±instead it was coined by Wilhelm Dilthey±the Primat der Außenpolitik 
is virtually synonymous with the Rankean worldview.44 5DQNH¶VSROLWLFDOWKHRU\LVDUWLFXODWHG
most prominently in a number of articles he published in Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift, a 
MRXUQDOKHHGLWHG LQ WKHV ,PSRUWDQWKHUH LV³$GLDORJXHRQSROLWLFV´ LQZKLFK5DQNH
stressed themes such as the organic state, self-preservation and security, sovereignty and 
independence and political necessity.45 Crucial here are the supremacy of security, the 
necessity of alliances and the subversion of principles to expediency. Ranke saw state security 
as the first priority7KHµVXSUHPHODZRIWKHVWDWH¶LVWRµRUJDQL]HDOOLWVLQWHUQDOUHVRXUFHVIRU
self-SUHVHUYDWLRQ¶ KH DUJXHG46 Nevertheless, despite the primacy of sovereignty and 
independence, Ranke concluded that when threats were great enough alliance formation was a 
necessity. Writing on the anti-NapROHRQLFDOOLDQFHKHZURWHµ>LWZDVRQO\@WKHKXJHGDQJHURI
a newly risen power, which threatened independence everywhere, [which] finally created, in 
WKHIDFHRIDQQLKLODWLRQDVLWZHUHDFRPPRQGHIHQVH¶47 Lastly, for Ranke, what mattered in 
terms of international relations was not ideology or opinion but rather interest shaped by 
political necessity. In discussing the Austrian-Russian alliance and its dissolution, he 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHUHµLVQRWUHQGRIRSLQLRQKRZHYHUGRPLQDQWZKLFKFDQEUHDNWKHIRrce of 
SROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWV¶48 Also important is 5DQNH¶V³7KHJUHDWSRZHUV´ZKLFKWUDFHGWKHULVHRI
Prussia under Frederick II, the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars.49 Although 
historically dense, it is possible to draw out a major theme from this text: for Ranke, the internal 
development of the Prussian state was a product of the international relations it was situated 
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NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 71. 
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within and subjected to.50 This is what Simms and Mulligan refer to as the descriptive aspect 
of the Primat der Außenpolitik, i.e. WKHQRWLRQWKDWDVWDWH¶VLQWHUQDOGHYHORSPHQWLVDSURGXFW
of its external relations.51 2UDVYRQ/DXHSXWV LW µ)RUHLJQDIIDLUV WKHQZHUH WKHVXSUHPH
IDFWRULQSROLWLFDOOLIH¶52 ,QGHHGLQ³7KHJUHDWSRZHUV´5DQNHTXRWLQJ+HUDFOLWXV¶PD[LPWKDW
war is the father of all things, basically contends that to understand the development of the 
European states and the system they inhabited one has to first appreciate the wars of the 
period.53 
Carr was familiar with both Ranke and Bismarck. His 19th August 1938 diary entry records 
that he read Bismarck.54 What is History indicates that he was equally aware of Ranke, 
particularly in terms of Rankean historiography.55 :KHWKHU&DUUZDV IDPLOLDUZLWK5DQNH¶V
Primat der Außenpolitik is debatable. However, Carr was certaLQO\IDPLOLDUZLWK0HLQHFNH¶V
inter-war work, which is evidenced by the fact that he cited it in 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV.56 
Meinecke, particularly prior to the Second World War, was in many respects the heir to the 
primacy of foreign affairs tradition.57 At the least, then, Carr inherited the tradition indirectly 
with Meinecke acting as a conduit. To bring some clarity so that a consideration of the influence 
of the SULPDF\RIIRUHLJQDIIDLUVWUDGLWLRQRQ&DUU¶s later historical work can be undertaken, 
following Simms,58 I distil the Primat der Außenpolitik to three aspects. First, security is prime 
EHFDXVHVWDWH¶VKDYHWRFRQVLGHUWKHLUGHIHQFHVHFXULW\DQGWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\DERYHDOOHOVH
Second, as a result, internal factors such as inter alia ideology that might preclude a state from 
seeking security can be overcome if political necessity dictates it. The example here is that 
ideologically divergent states may ally themselves if circumstances necessitate it. Third, 
although the external environment (i.e. geopolitics and geopolitical events) may condition 
policy, it does not determine it. Policy outcomes are open, that is, and agency is a historically 
real factor. 
Bevirian interpretivism maintains that dilemmas are crucial to understanding how an 
iQGLYLGXDO¶VWKRXJKWVDQGLGHDVHYROYHRYHUWLPH'LOHPPDVPD\H[SODLQWKHUHIRUHwhy Carr 
turned from a more radical, theoretical realism to a more pragmatic, conservative form of 
realism. 0DQ\GLOHPPDVVKDSHG&DUU¶VWKRXJKW over the course of his scholarly career, which 
in turn influenced how he spun his web of beliefs. Notable was the Manchurian crisis and, as 
SUHYLRXVO\PHQWLRQHGWKH$E\VVLQLDQFULVLV7KHIRUPHUOHG&DUUWRDFFHSWWKHFRQFOXVLRQµWKDW
PHPEHUV RI WKH /HDJXH«ZHUH QRW SUHSDUHG WR UHVLVW an act of aggression committed by a 
powerful and well-DUPHGVWDWH¶ZKLOHWKHODWWHUFDXVHGWKHUHDOLVDWLRQWKDWµ*UHDW%ULWDLQZDV
QRWOHVVILUPWKDQ)UDQFHLQKHUUHVROYHQRWWREHGUDZQLQWRZDUZLWK,WDO\¶59 The Prague crisis, 
which evidenced the collapse of the Munich settlement, also saw Carr reorient the meanings 
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KHDWWDFKHGWR&KDPEHUODLQ¶VSROLF\RIDSSHDVHPHQW60 ,QGHHGLWZDVSHUKDSV&DUU¶VDGYRFDF\
of appeasement that did much to influence his scholarly trajectory. In his autobiographical 
statemeQWKHUHIOHFWHGRQKLVVKDPHRIWKHWH[W¶VµKDUVK³UHDOLVP´¶61 In private correspondence 
to his publishers not long after 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV was published, he even implied that 
it was a plus that bookshops were not stocking±and had not even heard of±the work.62 The 
political climate in addition to the critical reviews of 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV in particular63 
seemingly undermined his faith in his academic pursuits. When asked about his future research 
intentions in 1943, Carr responded that he did not IHHOµVXIILFLHQWO\LQWHUHVWHGDWWKLVWLPHWR
write anything of a purely historical or analytical character, and anything containing views or 
proposals about the future would almost inevitable be over-taken by events before it got into 
SULQW¶64 Although he would later publish on nationalism and sovereignty, post-war he was 
sceptical about analytical and theoretical research. In one particular review of Ernest 
:RRGZDUG¶VThe Study of International Relations at University, he seemed to suggest that the 
conteQWRI,5ZDV³ZKDWWKHDFDGHPLF´PDGHLW,QUHMHFWLQJ:RRGZDUG¶VYLHZWKDWLQWHOOHFWXDO
dilettantism had resulted in a lack of IR in universities&DUUDVNHGµ,V it not rather the natural 
result of the persistent failure to provide facilities in this country for organized modern 
historical research in the sense in which it was understood and practised in Germany before 
1933 and is still understood and practised in the United States?¶65 &DUU¶V WKRXJKWV ZHUH
evidently turning toward history; his empirical work toward the Soviet Union.66 Whilst The 
7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV may have developed as a staple in the developing IR field in the United 
States at least, the shifting international environment, inter alia, meant that Carr was becoming 
something of an outcast.67 %\ORRNLQJDW&DUU¶VODWer work on Soviet foreign affairs specifically, 
the subsequent section seeks to use these dilemmas as a backdrop for charting KRZ&DUU¶VXVH
of the realist tradition subsequently evolved from the more radical to the more conservative.   
IV. &DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHV   
&DUUZURWHIRXUGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVRIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVBritain: A Study of Foreign 
Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War, German-Soviet Relations between 
the Two World Wars, 1919±1939 and his two books on Soviet interwar diplomacy, The 
Twilight of Comintern, 1930±1935 and The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War. Prior to his 
death in 1982, he also began work on a companion volume to Twilight entitled The Popular 
Front, 1935±1938. Although the work was never completed or published, a posthumous edition 
was prepared by Robert W. Davies (who had previously collaborated with Carr on his 
History).68 Britain, which was published in the same year as 7KH 7ZHQW\ <HDUV¶ &ULVLV, 
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provided an overview of British policy between the wars. Aspects of the work were directed 
toward defending the policy of appeasement, especially after the Prague crisis in 1939. 
German-Soviet Relations was published in 1951 and was drawn from lectures Carr gave for 
the Albert Shaw Lectures in Baltimore. Theoretically ideas found in both Britain and German-
Soviet Relations may also reflect the primacy of foreign affairs tradition. However, the 
VXEVHTXHQW DQDO\VLV IRFXVHV VSHFLILFDOO\ RQ &DUU¶V KLVWRULHV RI 6RYLHW IRreign affairs as a 
coherent set of ideas produced in a relatively coherent timeframe, i.e. in the final years of his 
life. To attempt to analyse works that span forty years may run the risk of presenting an 
idealised and timeless portrait of Carr, which would obviously stand in stark contrast to the 
intepretivist method employed here.  
5DLVRQG¶état  
$VRXWOLQHGDERYHWKLVUHIHUVWRWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWVWDWHVHFXULW\LVSULPHEHFDXVHVWDWH¶VKDYH
to and indeed should consider their defence, security and territorial integrity above all other 
matters.69 ,WFDQEHVKRZQWKDWLQPDQ\UHVSHFWV&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVRI6RYLHWIRUHLJQ
affairs during the twenty year reflect the principle of UDLVRQ G¶pWDW. Take Twilight as an 
example. Carr begins by charting the principal security threat facing the Soviet Union in the 
early 1930s. In the wake of the great depression and as the international system edged toward 
FKDRV 0RVFRZ¶V FKLHI DQ[LHW\ ZDV WKDW µWKH ZHVWHUQ 3RZHUV ZRXOG VHHN WR VROYH WKHLU
difficulties, and sLQNWKHLUGLIIHUHQFHVLQFRPELQHGDFWLRQDJDLQVWWKH8665¶70 In turn, this 
PHDQWWKDWPDLQWDLQLQJSURSHUµUHODWLRQVZLWK*HUPDQ\ZHUHDPDWWHURIVXSUHPHLPSRUWDQFH¶
as a hedge against a united capitalist coalition.71 +LWOHU¶VDVFHQGDQF\WRSRZHUDQGWKHUise of a 
revisionist Japan, however, caused a volte-face in Soviet strategy. By the mid-V*HUPDQ\¶V
PRUH DJJUHVVLYH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LQ SDUWLFXODU FDUULHG D µIUHVK WKUHDW WR WKH 8665¶ FUHDWHG
µLQFUHDVLQJ WHQVLRQ LQ6RYLHW-*HUPDQ UHODWLRQV¶ DQGSDYHG WKH way for détente between the 
Soviet Union and the western capitalist powers (the Soviet Union even joined the League of 
Nations in late 1934 and signed a mutual defence pact with France in 1935).72 For Carr this 
shift in Soviet policy, coupled with the subvHUVLRQRIWKH&RPLQWHUQ¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\DJHQGDWR
Soviet security interests, was understood in terms of maintaining the defence and security of 
the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the threat posed by Nazi Germany.73 This idea is carried forward in 
The Spanish Civil War where Carr details the manner in which Soviet strategy, particularly 
through the Comintern, became increasingly concerned with security and national interest over 
the promotion of revolution. Indeed, in her introduction to the posthumously published work 
7DPDUD'HXWVFKHUQRWHGWKDWIRU&DUUµ0RVFRZ¶VDWWLWXGHWR6SDLQZDVGLFWDWHGOHVVDQGOHVV
by the raison de la révolution and more by the Soviet UDLVRQG¶pWDW¶74 In principle, this meant 
that despite pressure amongst ideologues for more support to the republicans and Leftists 
ILJKWLQJ)UDQFRWKLVµSUHVVXUHZDVVXEMHFWHGWRWKHUHVWUDLQWRIGLSORPDWLFH[SHGLHQF\¶75 That 
LV0RVFRZZDVGHWHUPLQHGWRµNHHSWKHIRUHLJQSROLF\RIWKH8665LQOLQHZLWKWKDWRI)UDQFH
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and Britain, its political allies against WKHPHQDFHRIWKH)DVFLVWSRZHUV¶76 That is not to say 
that Soviet strategy was completely passive. Arms were supplied, military advisers were 
provided and Soviet influence via the Comintern was evident in political machinations that 
took place in Spanish politics.77 But these were undertaken covertly and lessened over time. 
:KDW&DUUUHIHUUHGWRDVµUHYROXWLRQDU\DUGRXU¶LQ6RYLHWIRUHLJQSROLF\JDYHµSODFHWRWKHFRRO
FDOFXODWLRQVRIGLSORPDF\¶78 /XUNLQJEHKLQGWKLVVKLIWZDVWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VQHHGWRHQgage 
in a rapprochement with the western powers as a counterweight to the threat posed by Nazi 
Germany in particular.79 The threat from Germany, and the necessity of maintaining good 
relations with the western powers, was also a crucial ingredient in terms of Soviet strategy in 
the latter part of the 1930s. Indicative here was the way in which Carr portrayed the Soviet 
UHVSRQVH WR +LWOHU¶V UHPLOLWDULVDWLRQ RI WKH 5KLQHODQG $OWKRXJK 0D[LP /LWYLQRY 3HRSOH¶V
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, like his western couQWHUSDUWVGHQRXQFHG*HUPDQ\¶VDFWLRQV
µKH GLG QRW VHSDUDWH KLPVHOI IURP WKH WHPSRUL]LQJ DWWLWXGH RI KLV %ULWLVK DQG )UHQFK
FROOHDJXHV¶80 7KH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ DW WKLV MXQFWXUH ZDV FKLHIO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK SXUVXLQJ µD
coalition with bourgeois states in a common IURQWDJDLQVW)DVFLVP¶81 For Carr, this explained 
/LWYLQRY¶VDSSUHKHQVLRQWRZDUGWKHUHPLOLWDULVDWLRQRIWKH5KLQHODQG0RUHRYHUDVZLWKThe 
Spanish Civil WarWKH&RPLQWHUQ¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\LPSXOVHVZHUHVXSHUVHGHGE\WKHDLPVRIWKH
popular front (an alliance with bourgeoisie parties in opposition to fascism) as a direct result 
of the threatening international environment.82 5DLVRQG¶pWDW ZDVHYLGHQWO\FUXFLDOWR&DUU¶V
interpretations of Soviet foreign affairs during the 1930s.  
International relations trump ideology 
This is equally true of the notion that political expediencies generated by international relations 
trump inter alia LGHRORJLFDODLPV7KDWLV&DUU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6RYLHWIRUHLJQDIIDLUVGXULQJ
the 1930s emphasised the manner in which the revolutionary aims of the Soviet Union, and by 
extension the Comintern, were by necessity diluted. One of the principles put forth by Carr in 
TwilightIRUH[DPSOHPDGHWKHFDVHWKDWLQWKHVWKHµZRUOGKDGEHFRPHWRRGDQJHURXs a 
SODFHIRUUDVKUHYROXWLRQDU\DGYHQWXUHV¶83 Moscow, in other words, gradually came to the view 
WKDW UHYROXWLRQDU\ RXWEUHDNV ZRXOG µSURYRNH )UHQFK LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ DQG µIDQ KRVWLOLW\ WR WKH
8665¶84 2YHUWLPHDQGDVD UHVXOW WKH&RPLQWHUQµFDPHURXQGVORZOy to the opinion that 
FRPPXQLVW SDUWLHV FRXOG SURILWDEO\ FROODERUDWH ZLWK RWKHU /HIW SDUWLHV«HYHQ ZLWK SDUWLHV
ZKLFKGLGQRWDFFHSWWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\SURJUDPPHRIFRPPXQLVP¶85 That is not to say that 
the suspension of ideological conflict was easy or took place evenly. Mutual antagonisms 
EHWZHHQWKHVRFLDOLVWVDQGWKHFRPPXQLVWVLQ*HUPDQ\HYHQDIWHU+LWOHU¶VDVFHQVLRQWRSRZHU
made political unity problematic.86 Nevertheless, by the mid-1930s, particularly owing to the 
LQIOXHQFHRIWKH&RPLQWHUQ¶VWKHQOHader, Georgi Dimitrov, policy was dictated by the need for 
collaboration with the bourgeois left. And for Carr, this resulted from the necessities generated 
by the international relations of the period.87 His interpretation of Soviet policy during the 
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Spanish civil war reflected the same principle. In Spain the popular front was galvanised by 
the threat from Franco and the support he received from the fascist powers.88 In turn, a unity 
government composed of socialists and communists, although not anarchists, was established 
in the autumn of 1936.89 7KHFRQIOLFWLQ6SDLQIURP&DUU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDOVRKXUULHGWKHSURFHVV
he had identified in The Twilight. That is, despite facing stiff resistance from hardliners such 
as Wilhelm Knorin and Béla Kun, Dimitrov was able to undermine cherished communist 
doctrine and advance the principles of the popular national front.90 For Carr, this development 
was understood in terms of political necessity. The Spanish civil war, that is, was evidence of 
WKHPDQQHULQZKLFKµOHDGHUVLQ0RVFRZ¶ZHUHVWULYLQJWRµVXERUGLQDWHWKHGLVWDQWSURVSHFWVRI
proletarian revolution to the immediate emergency of building a broad basis of resistance to 
WKH )DVFLVW GDQJHU¶91 The historical narrative was carried further forward by Carr in The 
Popular Front. His chapter on the French experience is indicative here. Unlike the German 
experience noted above, the French communist party was better placed for political 
FRKDELWDWLRQ µ)UDQFH¶ZURWH&DUU µZDV FRQWLQXRXVO\ FRQVFLRXVRI WKHPLOLWDU\ WKUXVW Irom 
1D]L*HUPDQ\¶,QWXUQWKH)UHQFKFRPPXQLVWSDUW\FRXOGµVRXQGDSDWULRWLFQRWHDQGWDNHLWV
stand with parties of a different social complexion on a common platform of national defence 
DJDLQVW )DVFLVW RSSUHVVLRQ¶92 Political necessity, in other words, meant ideological 
compromise. In terms of Soviet foreign affairs more specifically, what Carr±perhaps 
controversially±depicted as the victory of realism over idealism was also crucial to his 
historical narrative.93 µ,Q0RVFRZ¶ZURWH&DUUµWKHEXLOGLQJRf a firm alliance with the western 
powers to counter the Fascist threat seemed the supreme and over-riding aim of Soviet foreign 
SROLF\¶94 Stalin had, for Carr at least, refashioned the Comintern±subverted cherished ideology 
in other words±in the name of political expediency.95  
Context conditions but does not determine 
As others have noted, Carr was not a determinist.96 Instead, he tried to find an appropriate 
balance or synthesis between voluntarism and determinism, structure and agency or context 
and conduct.97 This outlook is equally evident in his histories of Soviet foreign affairs during 
WKH ODWWHU KDOI RI WKH WZHQW\ \HDUV¶ FULVLV ,Q WXUQ KLV KLVWRULFDO ZULWLQJ FKLPHG ZLWK LGHDV
outlined previously as reflecting the primacy of foreign affairs tradition. This is particularly 
evident in Twilight ZHUH&DUUWRXFKHGXSRQ6WDOLQ¶VUHODWLYHO\SDVVLYHUROHLQ6RYLHWIRUHLJQ
affairs. Particularly in the first half of the 1930s Stalin, according to Carr, was chiefly 
concerned with economic and political priorities on the domestic front. Rather than exercising 
control, he left foreign affairs, in terms of both Narkomindel and the Comintern, in the hands 
of Litvinov.98 6WDOLQ¶VUHOXFWDQFHRULQGHFLVLRQIURP&DUU¶VYDQWDJHµSURORQJHGDQDQRPDORXV
situation in which officials of Comintern spoke with different voices, and directives issue to 
FRPPXQLVWSDUWLHVZHUHFRQIOLFWLQJDQGLQGHFLVLYH¶99 +LWOHU¶VDVFHQVLRQWRSRZHUPD\KDYH
                                                 
88 Carr, Spanish Civil War, pp. 11±12. 
89 Ibid., p. 19. 
90 Ibid., pp. 20±21. 
91 Ibid., p. 34.  
92 Carr, Popular Front, p. 36. 
93 Ibid., p. 131. 
94 Ibid., p. 128.  
95 Ibid., pp. 49±50. 
96 +RZHµ7KHXWRSLDQUHDOLVPRI(+&DUU¶SS±284; Jones, EH Carr and International Relations, pp. 144±
*HUPDLQµ(+&DUUDQGWKHKLVWRULFDOPRGHRIWKRXJKW¶S 
97 Carr, Conditions of Peace, p. 6; Carr, 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV, pp. 89±101; Carr, The New Society, p. 14; Carr, 
What is History?, p. 95. 
98 Carr, Twilight, p. 122.  
99 Ibid., p. 124.  
radically transformed the threat to the Soviet Union, but leaders still have to perceive and react 
to the international context. In that respect, the international context conditioned but did not 
determine Soviet foreign policy. Carr even noted how Stalin initially saw no threat in Hitler 
and the Nazis, believing that if they did come to power they would be principally concerned 
with looking westward.100 Similar ideas are evident in The Spanish Civil War. Italian and 
German intervention in the civil war could have potentially rewritten the European balance of 
power.101 Russian policy toward the conflict, however, was relatively limited±as was the 
response from France and Britain.102 Domestic conditions±notably in Britain the presence of 
the Conservative government and the privatised armament industry and in France factional 
disputes amongst the leadership±influenced the direction of policy.103 For the Soviets, Carr 
believed that it was not simply diplomatic manoeuvring prompted by political necessity that 
mattered. He also believed that capabilities were an important factor in explaining Soviet 
policy. BoWKWKHµ&RPLQWHUQDQGWKH6RYLHWJRYHUQPHQWZHUHFRQFHUQHGWRSUHYHQW)UDQFR¶V
YLFWRU\¶KHZURWHµ\HWQHLWKHUKDGDWWKHLUGLVSRVDODGHTXDWHPHDQVWRDFKLHYHWKLVSXUSRVH¶104 
In The Popular Front, Carr also took care to point to the manner in which ideas regarding 
security and defence policy can be driven by factions. In particular, with regard to the principle 
RI WKH SRSXODU IURQW &DUU LGHQWLILHG D µFRYHUW VWUXJJOH¶ LQ ERWK FRPPXQLVW SDUWLHV DQG WKH
Comintern leadership regarding the righteousness of the popular front doctrine.105 The 
international environment certainly provided the context for Soviet foreign affairs in the 1930s, 
but individuals and institutions±and importantly disputes between them±mediated its effects.106  
The last point indicates that CarU¶V GLSORPDWLF KLVWRULHV GHPRQVWUDWH FRQFHUQV EH\RQG WKH
primacy of foreign affairs in Soviet foreign policy in in the inter-war era. One of his major 
concerns in each of the three works was in charting the political and ideological disputes and 
differences between Moscow, Comintern spokesman and foreign communist parties.107 Like 
aspects of his monumental History,108 the three works on Soviet foreign affairs offered a fine-
grained and highly detailed account of the institutions, personalities and factions involved in 
6RYLHWIRUHLJQDIIDLUVGXULQJWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶ FULVLV5DQNH¶VSULPDF\RIIRUHLJQDIIDLUVPD\
have noW WKHUHIRUH EHHQ WKH GHILQLQJ LQVSLUDWLRQ EHKLQG &DUU¶V KLVWRULHV RI 6RYLHW IRUHLJQ
affairs. Nevertheless, traces of Ranke are evident, even if silent, which is a point I will return 
to below.  
V. 7KHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVKLVWRU\DQGWUDJHG\  
From the pUHFHGLQJGLVFXVVLRQ LW LVHYLGHQW WKDW&DUU¶VRIWHQRYHUORRNHGKLVWRULHVRI6RYLHW
foreign affairs speak in places to the primacy of foreign affairs tradition. This interpretation of 
his work is certainly of interest to Carr-specific scholars. More importantly, the approach 
outlined above, i.e. the interpretivist framework of traditions and dilemmas, offers a starting 
                                                 
100 Ibid., p. 52. 
101 Carr, The Spanish Civil War, p. 12. 
102 Ibid., p. 15 
103 Ibid., p. 14. 
104 Ibid., p. 85. 
105 Ibid., pp. 35±36. 
106 ,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKHUHLVDFHUWDLQDPRXQWRIFURVVRYHUEHWZHHQ&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVDQGWKHQHRFODVVLFDO
realist approach. For this argument with regard to Britain and German-Soviet relations see .HLWK 6PLWK µ$
reassessment of E.H. Carr and the realist tradition: Britain, German-Soviet Relations DQGQHRFODVVLFDOUHDOLVP¶
International Politics, forthcoming. Although, as will be returned to in the next section, the similarities between 
&DUU¶VPLQRUZRUNVDQGWKH1RUWK$PHULFDQUHDOLVWWUDGLWLRQVKRXOGQRWEHKDVWLO\RYHUGRQH 
107 Carr, Twilight, p. 70; Carr, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 20±21; Carr, Popular Front, p. 34. 
108 Haslam, Vices of Integrity, p. 178±181. 
point for thinking about the progress and evolution of his scholarly career and thought, 
particularly from the IR theorist to conservative hiVWRULDQ +RZHYHU UHFRYHULQJ &DUU¶V
histories±or at least recognising their potential significance±has greater implications, especially 
in terms of the how we think about the realist canon. Lumping together Carr, Morgenthau and 
Waltz, Palan and Blair conclude that their respective theories of the state result from the 
µH[SORVLRQRILGHDVLQWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\SDUWLFXODUO\LQ*HUPDQ\ZKLFKJDYHWRULVHWR
WKH PRGHUQ«YHUVLRQ RI WKH UHDOLVW WKHRU\ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV¶109 Leaving aside the 
question of an unbroken and timeless realism stretching from nineteenth century Germany (if 
not before) into the interwar period and then Cold War era, the notion of a shared heritage does 
UDLVHVRPHSURYRFDWLYHTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&DUU¶VGLSORmatic histories of 
Soviet foreign affairs and realist work published in a similar era, although in the North 
$PHULFDQWUDGLWLRQ/HERZFDOOV5DQNHµDQLQHWHHQWK-FHQWXU\SUHFXUVRURI.HQQHWK:DOW]¶110 
There is logic behind this reasoning. Waltz fleshed out his socialisation mechanism (the 
principle that the competitive nature of the system compels states to act in a similar manner) 
ZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRWKHWDPLQJRIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\DLPVLQWHUHVWLQJO\HQRXJKE\
way of a reference to Theodore von Laue).111 :DOW¶VThe Origins of Alliance is also indicative 
here. One of the principal arguments in this monograph was the idea that alliance formation 
was a product less of shared ideology and more a product of political expediency generated by 
external threat.112 Primed, to borrow from Steele,113 for approaching Carr through the 
revisionist literature, I was puzzled when reading Carr, thinking Walt and hearing Waltz.  
This argument has recently been advanced by Parent and Baron.114 Akin to the revisionist 
literature identified in footnote six of this article, they argue that contemporary realists±they 
specifically identify Waltz and Mearsheimer±have misread the classical works of Morgenthau 
and Carr amongst others (with regards to Carr they refer specifically to his abridged History). 
Where they detract from the aforementioned revisionist literature, is that they seek to highlight 
DIILQLWLHVEHWZHHQ³FODVVLFDO´UHDOLVWVIRUZDQWRIDEHWWHUZRUGDQGWKose realists commonly 
identified as neorealists. They argue that the common neorealist charges brought against the 
mid-twentieth century writers±specifically that they focused on human nature to the detriment 
of structure and were theoretically unsophisticated±are overstated. Reviewing the centrality of 
key concepts across realists in time, notably anarchy and its consequences, they conclude that 
µWKH FODVVLFV DUH WLJKWO\ DOOLHG ZLWK VWUXFWXUDO DQDO\VLV DQG H[WUHPHO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK
QHRUHDOLVP¶115 Moreover, they contend that there is a lot more theory in the classical works 
than is generally recognised. Turning again to Carr specifically, and quoting liberally from 
What is History, they point to his focus on cause as evidence of his concern with theory, if from 
a historical explanatory basis.116 Overall, this allows them WR PDNH WKH FDVH WKDW µFODVVLFDO
UHDOLVWVHVFDSHFKDUJHVRIKXPDQQDWXUHUHDOLVPDQGWKHRUHWLFDOLQFRPSHWHQFH¶E\µH[SODLQLQJ
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WKHVDPHSDWWHUQVZLWKHVVHQWLDOO\ WKH VDPHFRQFHSWVDQG ORJLFDVQHRUHDOLVWV¶117 From this 
vantage, part of the glue binding neorealists and classical realists is the shared intellectual 
inheritance from the nineteenth century German realists, Meinecke in particular and by 
extension Ranke.118 
One could argue that the commensurability thesis is overdone. :KLOVW &DUU¶V GLSORPDWLF
histories of Soviet foreign affairs during the interwar era may share an intellectual inheritance 
with the North American realist tradition, there are evident differences, especially in terms of 
incommensurate underlying understandings of history. This is the basis of the interpretivist 
FODLP DQG LWV VWUHQJWK LQ WHUPV RI DQDO\VLQJ LQWHOOHFWXDO WKRXJKW 7UDGLWLRQV DUH µD VWDUWLQJ
SRLQW¶WKH\GRQRWGHWHUPLQHKRZDQLQGLYLGXDOLQFRUSRUDWHVLGHDVLQWRWKHLUH[LVWLQJZHERI
beliefs.119 Carr and notable neorealists may have been influenced by the Rankean tradition of 
foreign affairs, either directly or indirectly, but their respective use, understanding and 
development of said tradition are ultimately unique and based on creative agency. In particular, 
there is an evident divergence in terms of philosophy of history. Whilst neorealists typically 
work within a history without historicism tradition, Carr, at least in his histories of Soviet 
foreign affairs, worked from a traditional even Rankean approach to history.120 History without 
historicism is typically concerned with the general over the particular. The historical record is 
seen as a testing ground for deductive theoretical propositions and hypotheses. As Hobson and 
Lawson state, neorealists generally use history, chiefly secondary sources, to verify, refine and 
refute their theoretical propositions.121 Traditional history, in contrast, is typically atheoretical 
(at least outwardly so);122 is concerned chiefly with (if not fetishizes) primary, archival sources 
(is based on historical fact in other words); and seeks to construct accurate causal accounts of 
historical events.123 ,URQLFDOO\ JLYHQ &DUU¶V FULWLFLVP RI 5DQNHDQ KLVWRULRJUDSK\ LQ What is 
History, there are evident traces of this traditional approach in his histories of Soviet foreign 
affairs.124 His diplomatic histories are filled with what Haslam refHUV WR DV &DUU¶V
µ³QHHGOHZRUN´¶±that is, µGHWDLOHGHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKDQGZULWLQJ¶125 Consequently they reflect 
the traditional history approach just outlined&DUU¶VSreface to Twilight clearly indicates that 
KH VRXJKW WR µnarrate what happened in Moscow and what happened in the parties [of the 
&RPLQWHUQ@¶126 The works are based on archival research, with a specific focus on memoirs, 
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typically bypassing his earlier reflective comments on this method.127 Moreover, his three 
works on Soviet foreign affairs were largely atheoretical. Although it is possible to detect a 
Rankean sensibility in them, in terms of the primacy of foreign affairs, Carr made no explicit 
use or attested to a concern with theory here. His works on Soviet foreign affairs, in other 
words, contained a realism that never spoke its name.  
,I &DUU¶V KLVWRULHV RI 6RYLHW IRUHLJQ DIIDLUV GXULQJ WKH WZHQW\ \HDUV¶ FULVLV DUH WUDGLWLRQDO
histories, then this surely puts them at odds with his earlier work. From the interpretivist 
perspective, this is not problematic. In the course of a scholarly career an intellectual may come 
to exhibit or espouse thought that is radically different from traditions that they had previously 
LPELEHGIURP$V%HYLUH[SODLQVµ>DQLQGLYLGXDOPD\@HYHQUHMHFW>DWUDGLWLRQ@LQDZD\WKDW
PLJKWPDNHLWDQ\WKLQJEXWFRQVWLWXWLYHRIWKHZHERIEHOLHIVWKDWWKH\>ODWHU@FRPHWRKROG¶128 
We can see this through a brief illustrative contrast between &DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVDQG 
7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV (and indeed his other inter-war work), with the latter exhibiting a 
more critical-theoretical edge.129 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLVspeaks more strongly to the radical, 
theoretical and critical tradition of Mannheim as opposed to the Primat der Außenpolitik 
tradition of Ranke. Drawing from Mannheim, and applying it to the work of Morgenthau, Behr 
and Heath suggest that Standortgebunden PHDQV µQRthing more than the theoretical 
acknowledgement of the socio-politically contingent character of history, and the practical 
recognition of a certain, if temporary, historical condition and subsequent way of acting under 
WKHVHFRQGLWLRQV¶130 These ideas are certainly evident in 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV. Indeed, 
(YDQVRYHUWKLUW\\HDUVDJRLQWKLVYHU\MRXUQDOFRQFOXGHGWKDWXQLWLQJ&DUU¶VLQWHUZDUoeuvre 
ZDVWKHµQRWLRQWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHVRIRQHDJHFDQQRWZLWKRXWJUHDWGDQJHUEHFDUULHGRYHUWR
another wherHWKHSUREOHPVDQGWKHFRQWH[WDUHGLIIHUHQW¶131 One passage from The Twenty 
<HDUV¶&ULVLV can illuminate on this:  
In a limited number of countries, nineteenth-century liberal democracy had been a brilliant 
success. It was a success because its presuppositions coincided with the stage of development 
UHDFKHGE\WKHFRXQWULHVFRQFHUQHG«%XWWKHYLHZWKDWQLQHWHHQWK-century liberal democracy 
was based, not on a balance of forces peculiar to the economic development of the period and 
the countries concerned, but on certain a priori rational principles which had only to be applied 
in other contexts to produce similar results, was essentially utopian.132 
&DUU¶VLQWHUZDUZRUNPRUHEURDGO\ZDVFRQFHUQHGZLWKSURJUHVVLYHFKDQJH3URJUHVVLYHQHVV
according to Wilson, is WKHµEHOLHIWKDWWKHZRUOGGRHVQRWKDYHWRORRNWKHZD\WKDWLWGRHVDQG
that through reason, courage, imagination and determination it is possible to arrive at a better 
ZD\RIEHLQJDQGOLYLQJ¶133 6HZHGWKURXJK&DUU¶VEHWWHUNQRZQZRUNLQWKHLQWHUZDUHUa are 
hopes for and imaginations of a new and more stable political order. This is evident in his 
discussion of peaceful change, the prospect of post-national sovereignty and the elimination of 
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the profit motive from foreign policy. It is also apparent in Nationalism and After where Carr 
ruminates on the prospects of a more peaceful post-war order based on individual rights, 
functional intergovernmental institutions and common moral principles. &DUU¶V FDOO IRU WKH
µUHYROXWLRQ>WR@EHJLQDWKRPH¶LQThe Conditions of Peace and his subsequent outline of a post-
war social democratic welfare coupled with centralised planning also illustrate his 
progressiveness.134 
This critical edge is not evident LQ&DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVWKHGLOHPPDV&DUUH[SHULHQFHG
(previously outlined) potentially explain this shift from radical theoretician to conservative 
historian. His diplomatic histories as a story of what was are emptied of the progressive aspects 
of his other analytical work that focused on what could be. ,W VKRXOG EH FOHDU WKDW &DUU¶V
H[SODQDWRU\DFFRXQWVRIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVIDOORXWVLGHWKHFXUUHQWGLVFLSOLQDU\WUHQGRI
reading the classics as critical theory (or at least looking for critical theory insights in the 
FODVVLFDOZRUNV0RUJHQWKDX¶VAmerican Foreign Policy does likewise, and could be equally 
mined for the Primat der Außenpolitik tradition.135 Thus, while it may be true that Carr (and 
indeed Morgenthau) drew from traditions of thought not typically associated with 
contemporary realist theorising, i.e. the Frankfurt school and Marx,136 they equally drew from 
traditions of thought, i.e. the Primat der Außenpolitik, not typically associated with critical 
theory. 
Prima facie, then, &DUU¶VGLSORPDWLFKLVWRULHVRI6RYLHWIRUHLJQDIIDLUVGXULQJWKH WZHQW\\HDUV¶
crisis may offer little for contemporary IR theory. They are, after all, history (and a traditional 
history at that). Such a view would be inaccurate, however. 5HDGLQJWKHILQDOFKDSWHU³7KH
GHVFHQW LQWR FKDRV´ IURP KLV ILQDO XQSXEOLVKHG Zork, The Popular Front, it is possible to 
interpret in Carr a Lebowean sensibility. Tracing the tragedy genre and concept to fifth-century 
Athens, Erskine and Lebow, drawing from Aristotle, point to the importance of hamartia, 
peripeteia and anagnorisis.137 Hamartia UHIHUVWRDQHUURURIMXGJHPHQWRQWKHSURWDJRQLVW¶V
part. Peripeteia UHIHUVWRWKHUHYHUVDORIIRUWXQHWKDWUHVXOWVIURPWKHSURWDJRQLVW¶Vhamartia. 
Anagnorisis is the cathartic revelation and transformation of self that results from the 
realisation of the initial error of judgement. Tragedy as a narrative device is concerned with 
inter alia highlighting human limitations and fallibility, particularly in terms of deliberation 
and decision-making in terms of competing ethical and moral commitments.138 7KH µFRUH
LQVLJKWRIWUDJHG\¶LV WKHUHIRUHWKHSURFHVVRI OHDUQLQJLWHQJHQGHUVVSHFLILFDOO\ LQ WHUPVRI
NQRZLQJµRQH¶VRZQOLPLWV¶139 Utilising the works of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Morgenthau, 
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Press, 1981). 
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Toni Erskine and Richard N. Lebow, eds., Tragedy and International Relations (London: Palgrave, 2012), p. 3. 
138 Ibid., p. 6.  
139 Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics, p. 20.  
the Lebowean sensibility depicts the bonds between community, cooperation, justice, ethics 
and honour and, amongst other things criticises the expediency of realpolitik in terms of its 
self-defeating consequences.140 7KLVVHQVLELOLW\DOORZVXVWRUHFRJQLVHDV/HERZZULWHVµWKDW
communal bonds are fragile and easily undermined by the unrestrained pursuit of unilateral 
DGYDQWDJH«:KHQWKLVKDSSHQVWLPH-KRQRUHGPHFKDQLVPVRIFRQIOLFWPDQDJHPHQW«PD\QRW
only fail to preserve the peace but may make domestic and international violence more 
OLNHO\¶141 
These concepts can LOOXPLQDWHXSRQ&DUU¶VWKRXJKWVHVSHFLDOO\ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHDSSHDVHPHQW
of Nazi Germany and Munich in particular. Following the annexation of Austria by Germany 
in 1938, which Carr identified as a turning point in his view of Germany,142 increased tensions 
and insecurity cast a shadow over European politics. Czechoslovakia was widely seen as 
+LWOHU¶VQH[WWDUJHW7KH)UDQFR-Soviet mutual assistance treaty and the Soviet-Czech mutual 
assistance treaty meant that the Soviet Union was obliged to assist Czechoslovakia in a conflict, 
but only if France did. In The Popular Front Carr portrays Soviet leaders, particularly Vladimir 
Potemkin and Maxim Litvinov, in the run up to Munich as adhering firmly to the principles of 
collective security and collective action against an aggressor.143 In France, in contrast, Carr 
QRWHG WKDW WKH µIRUFHV GULYLQJ )UDQFH LQWR DFFRPPRGDWLRQ ZLWK *HUPDQ\ ZHUH JDWKHULQJ
VWUHQJWK¶144 Likewise, the resignation of the British Foreign Secretary indicated that Britain 
WRR VRXJKW µD FORVHU UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK *HUPDQ\¶145 This bewildered the Soviets who saw 
collective action as the most effective means to confront Nazi aggression.146 The result of 
French and British prevarication toward Hitler, and in pressing the Czechoslovakian 
government into appeasing Germany, meant that the Soviet Union was able to escape from the 
FULVLVZLWKRXWµSXEOLFGLVJUDFH¶147 ,QHQVXULQJQRµORVVRIFUHGLW¶WKH6RYLHW8QLRQHQVXUHGLWV
KRQRXU%ULWDLQDQG)UDQFHRQWKHRWKHUKDQGµ>EHWUD\HG@QRWRQO\WKHLUREOLJDWLRQVEXW«WKHLU
LQWHUHVWV¶148  
This narrative of honour/honourless actions in terms of the Munich crisis is important for a 
number of reasons. Broadly it illustrates the importance that Carr attached to cooperative or 
collective action over self-interested or unilateral action in his final interpretation of the 
dénouement RIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLV+DG%ULWDLQDQG)UDQFHDGKHUHGWRWKHLUREOLJDWLRQ±
acted honourably in other words±then the Soviet Union too would have been forced into 
defending Czechoslovakia against naked German aggression.149 It also illustrates the manner 
in which Carr interpreted±or perhaps even reinterpreted±realpolitik at this juncture. It was 
consequential in that it directly led to Soviet mistrust and the eventual tilt to Nazi Germany 
and, not least, the Second World War.150 For Carr specifically, given his earlier advocacy and 
then defence of appeasement (in terms of expediency), it serves to frame his hamartia (his 
advocacy), his peripeteia (his irrelevance to IR) and anagnorisis (his realisation of his error in 
judgement).151 The tragic can therefore not just help us conceptualise world politics but can 
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VI. Conclusion 
Significant research has sought to challenge tired depictions of classical figures in our 
discipline. Long viewed±and still viewed in some quarters±as a realpolitiker par excellence, to 
borrow from Deutscher,153 &DUU¶VWKRXJKWKDVLQFUHDVLQJO\EHHQUHYLVLWHG and revised. Where 
RQFH WH[WERRN FDULFDWXUHV OLWWHUHG WKH ODQGVFDSH WKH VXEWOHWLHV DQG QXDQFHV RI &DUU¶V
international thought now dominate, and quite rightfully so. Not seeking to challenge this 
movement, this paper has nevertheless demonstrated a significant gap in terms of the general 
QHJOHFWRI&DUU¶VODWHUZRUN&DUU¶VZULWLQJFDUHHUVSDQQHGIURPWKH1930s until his death in 
1982. To neglect his later work is anomalous. Although his two published monographs and his 
unpublished and unfinished symphony on Soviet foreign affairs may be historical, they are 
nevertheless still concerned with interstate diplomacy. Employing an interpretivist framework, 
this paper has made a first-cut at understanding the relationship between the Carr of The Twenty 
<HDUV¶ &Uisis, amongst other inter-war and post-war texts, and Carr the traditional Soviet 
historian. Locating the scholarly dilemmas which he faced following the Second World War, 
WKLV SDSHU KDV FKDUWHG &DUU¶V PRYHPHQW IURP D UDGLFDO DQG SURJUHVVLYH UHDOLVP WR D Pore 
conservative and traditional realism (interestingly the two realisms that are found, if implicitly, 
in 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV). Contained within his historical works on Soviet foreign affairs, 
if in silence, are traces of the Primat der Außenpolitik tradition. 
Although works of history, Twilight, The Spanish Civil War and The Popular Front are 
nevertheless still relevant today. Not least, they depict international relations at a time of crisis. 
The ideological struggles and conflict between left and left and between left and right contained 
within may be of a radically different era; but one cannot help think that 2016 marked a turning 
point in international politics. If so, Carr in his totality may be more relevant than he ever was. 
0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\KRZHYHU&DUU¶VKLVWRULHVRI6RYLHWIRUHLJQDIIDLUVPD\VHUYHWRLOOXPLQDWH
upon the tragedy of his scholarly work. The Popular Front, in particular, can be best thought 
of as the final stage in his movement from advocate of Munich, to defender of Munich to critic 
of Munich. The tragedy framework and a Lebowean sensibility, it is posited here, help us 
XQGHUVWDQGDQGDSSUHFLDWH&DUU¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOMRXUQH\Embedded within his histories of Soviet 
affairs, especially in terms of the dénouement RIWKHWZHQW\\HDUV¶FULVLVLVDOLYHGFULWLTXHRI
realpolitik ZKLFK WUDJLFDOO\ WKH GLVFLSOLQH KDV KLWKHUWR RYHUORRNHG 3HUKDSV &DUU¶V OLYHG
experience of realpolitik explains why the realism in his diplomatic histories did not speak its 
name.  
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